The Wittgensteinian idea of “language games” is a useful one, but ignored because it’s inconvenient is that the same ideas can be applied to “numbers games” as numericity and math does not exist independently of human thought and contextualizing.

One of the reasons for science’s reproducibility crisis is not that anything is fundamentally broken in science but rather that the world just cannot be separated from itself as strongly as would be helpful to observing significant effects in many areas.

I am not arguing against empiricism per se but rather the idea that it’s anything but provisional in arenas outside fundamental laws or extremely simple systems — and sometimes not even then.

Quantification leads too often to the illusion of knowledge rather than to knowledge, and quite frequently we have no way even in principle to determine the difference.

This is not also an argument that we know or can know nothing, but rather that what we can know is as constrained by the “numbers games” we can play just as what we can determine playing language games.

As usual, I am not sure that any of what I write here is true, but I am certain (and at this, Wittgenstein would probably grin) that it is what I am thinking at the time.